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The Kremlin’s Secret Police Legacy and Its Modern Resurgence 

By Ollie Willis

18 September 2024

9–13 minutes
Introduction 

Russia and its Kremlin are infamous for their role in political matters across the globe, whether it is regarding the current invasion of Ukraine or the spread of disinformation beyond its borders. This article aims to shed a light on the internal workings of the Kremlin and provide insight into the KGB’s influence including after their legal dissolution in 1991. Many former members of the KGB (Committee for State Security, now FSB) have found their way into the Kremlin and hold important positions of power. This mixture of political power and secret police involvement harks back to the Soviet era of ‘cloak and dagger’ politics, where any deviation from the status quo could result in imprisonment or worse that is seeing a resurgence in modern day Russia and the Kremlin. 

Historical background (1917-1995) 

The scale and magnitude of the topic can only be fully ascertained by looking at the history of Russia and its secret police as well as its volatile political climate. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the newly formed USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) needed a special policing branch to aid in the imprisonment, interrogation, and subjugation of dissidents. This formed the Cheka, the first of many secret policing groups that would have their reign over Russia. The Cheka answered only to Sovnarkom (the leaders of the state) and grew to over 200,000 personnel over the course of the Civil War (Rendle, 2016). The Cheka is to this day still regarded as one of the most brutal government agencies because during the Civil War it had the impunity to act in any manner it deemed necessary to stop ‘counter-revolutionary behaviour’. The Cheka forced the USSR into a period called the ‘Red Terror’ where it led mass imprisonment, executions, and the founding of the infamous gulags (labour camps) of the Soviet Union. This was not exclusive to civilian dissidents and supporters of the Tsarist white army, as the Cheka was also able to persecute many political figures. The Cheka marked the start of an era of fear within Russian politics, one that continues to the modern day, as even executives and ministers are not safe from the secret police. The Cheka’s reputation as being a brutal agency lives on to this day as the estimated death toll from their actions ranges from 50,000 to 250,000 (Rendle, 2011; The Cheka, G.P.U. And O.G.P.U.: Bolshevism’s Early Secret Police, 2001).  

In 1922, the Cheka was changed into the GPU (State Political Directorate). The GPU was a slightly more restricted version of the Cheka; it was not allowed to shoot on sight and was instructed to apprehend so that ‘counter-revolutionaries’ could face a show trial to deter future opposition. The GPU was then replaced by the OGPU (Joint State Political Directorate). The OGPU was formed in 1923 and lasted until 1934. The OGPU was in service when Stalin took power over the USSR in 1924, leading to more arrests and executions. Stalin utilized the OGPU to its full potential and turned the secret police into a weapon to be used against those within the Politburo (General Soviet Government Body) that disagreed with his politics and methodology. This was a precursor to Stalin’s ‘Purge’ that would occur throughout the mid to late 1930s. The OGPU essentially oversaw Stalin’s rise to the status of dictator (Overy, 2004). 

In 1934, the OGPU was dissolved and replaced by the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs). The NKVD was responsible for millions of imprisonments in work camps, mass deportation, and several foreign assassinations such as the assassination of Leon Trotsky, a Soviet politician and Stalin critic. The NKVD also saw the peak of Stalin’s ‘Great Purge’ (Weber, 2009; Zabłocki & Maciejewski, 1995). In 1937 and 1938, at least 1.3 million people were arrested and 680,000 were executed for ‘crimes against the state’ (Kramer, 2012; Zabłocki & Maciejewski, 1995). The death toll from 1930 to 1953 is estimated to range from 1.5 to 1.7 million (Healey & Alexopoulos, 2018). While many were average civilians, some were political figures, further cementing the place of ‘cloak and dagger’ politics under the boot of the state’s secret police. Over the course of World War Two, the NKVD would continue its campaign of violence and brutality, from the frontlines of the war to the Siberian gulags. The NKVD was dissolved in 1946 and replaced by the MGB (Ministry of State Security, 1946-53) and the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1953-54) (Kravtsova & Slade, 2024; Kramer, 2012; Weber, 2009; Zabłocki & Maciejewski, 1995; Furr, 2013). 

These two new agencies inherited the role of the secret police and continued to conduct Stalin’s ‘purges’ but on a smaller scale (Weber, 2009; Furr, 2013). The MGB was the main perpetrator of the atrocities committed in Stalin’s last few years. Between 1945 and 1953, more than 750,000 Soviet citizens were arrested and punished under their authority (Weber, 2009). The MVD instead transitioned from secret police into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, taking responsibility for internal troop movements and managing the prison system. The MVD’s duties related to the internal functions and security of the Soviet Union. For instance, it was responsible for investigating certain categories of crime, apprehending criminals, supervising the internal passport system, and managing prisons and labour camps. With Stalin’s death in 1953, the MVD was pushed more into its internal duties and the renowned, yet infamous KGB (Committee for State Security) was formed to take its place (Zickel, 1991). 

The KGB would be the primary secret police force for the duration of the Cold War, lasting from 1954 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War, the KGB became one of the most feared and capable secret police and counterintelligence agencies with few agencies being able to match its capabilities. The KGB was in charge of foreign intelligence, domestic counterintelligence, technical intelligence, protection of the political leadership, and the security of the country’s borders. In the late 1960s, an additional role was created to conduct surveillance on suspected dissidents in the churches and other institutions. For the next 20 years, the KGB became increasingly zealous in its pursuit of enemies, harassing, arresting, and sometimes exiling individuals who disagreed with them such as human rights advocates. Unfortunately, due the strict nature of Russia’s declassification laws, the scale and nature of the KGB’s activities are still not fully uncovered. Towards the end of the Soviet Union, the KGB still had influence on Kremlin politics. For instance, in 1991, its leadership led a coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the USSR, which was halted by Boris Yeltsin’s leadership. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolvement of the KGB, the FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) was formed in 1995 (Marten, 2017). 

Modern day (1995-2024)

Today, Russia is presided over by Vladimir Putin, an ex-KGB member known for his ruthlessness in the political sphere, especially inside the Kremlin. The KGB’s legacy has remained inside Russia’s political climate since the fall of the Soviet Union (Knight, 2000). The secret police methodology and mindset has been carried directly into the modern-day Kremlin. Since the start of the Ukraine invasion, many members of state who disagreed with Putin have disappeared. This phenomenon has been called ‘sudden Russian death syndrome’ or ‘sudden oligarch death syndrome’ as a joke by international media. The use of falsified suicides is an old technique in the world of secret police and state security (Brezar & Mac Dougall, 2022). One of the most famous deaths is that of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group PMC (Private Military Company) who died in a plane crash in late 2023. An investigation by US government bodies concluded that the plane was downed by anti-air defences (Marten, 2023). Another famous example is that of Alexei Navalny who was hospitalized by an attempted poisoning in 2020, which was suspected to have been arranged by Putin (Fomin & Nadskakuła-Kaczmarczyk, 2022). Navalny was later imprisoned in FKU IK-3, also known as ‘Polar Wolf’, a men’s maximum security corrective colony in the town of Kharp in Northern Siberia, about 2000km Northeast of Moscow. Navalny passed away in the prison camp after alleged malnutrition. Several of his lawyers are also currently under arrest for spreading Navalny’s information from the penal colony to the outside world (Gozzi & Boldyrev, 2024). 

While the convoluted power struggle unfolds within the Kremlin, the Ukraine War has proved vital in opening public perception into the Kremlin (Shuhei, 2022). One of the many points of debate is Putin himself, who continuously spreads disinformation when addressing the public and international stage (Erlich & Garner, 2023). Investigations by British intelligence services have uncovered information that suggests Putin might be unaware of how the war in Ukraine is going for Russia (Kozyrev, 2022). Many of the military officials might be afraid to question him in fear of ending up as another ‘suicide’ statistic. With the failure of Russian forces and nearly complete command structure breakdown within Ukraine, it is clear to many international intelligence agencies that Ukraine has turned into a personal war for Putin. He has proven for years that any direct attempt to counter his personal views and methods will be met with silent, subtle and swift retaliation. (Kozyrev, 2022; Knight, 2000; Shuhei, 2022). 

Conclusion

Throughout Russia’s history as a nation, the use of secret police and internal espionage has become the country’s trademark. With the on-going war in Ukraine and the global political climate escalating daily, it is becoming increasingly more important to remain vigilant regarding circulating information. Russia and its Kremlin are notorious for manufactured narratives and the worldwide spread of disinformation. Furthermore, Putin himself should be considered as a key component of this due to his KGB background and his political prowess. While some Western actors discredit Putin because of his ‘delusions’, it would be naïve to cast aside the notion of his competence, which could lead to unforeseen consequences on the political stage

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While we are transparent about all sources used in this article and double-checked the given information, we make no claims about its completeness, accuracy or reliability. If you notice a mistake or misleading phrasing, please send an email to centuria-sa@.hhs.nl .

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