By Ollie Willis
Introduction
Electronic warfare is the usage of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to help gain an operational advantage in a conflict (Gortney, 2012). Common techniques involve the use of radar, signal interception and jamming with the goal of impeding the capabilities of an enemy force. With electronic warfare becoming increasingly prevalent and available, it is important to be aware of its origins and capabilities, especially with ongoing conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian War that are highlighting how effective this method of warfare can be.
What is electronic warfare?
Electronic warfare (EW) is a method of warfare that utilises the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as an additional tool during a conflict. The main aim of this method of warfare is to deny the enemy access to such tools, while increasing your own access to these tools (Haig, 2014). A basic example is the use of radios by military personnel to communicate among themselves or with allies. It is critical that unimpeded communication without the threats of an intelligence leak can be ensured. On the other hand, denying the enemy use of their radios will slow them down by impeding their communication capabilities, thus limiting the enemy’s effectiveness in their war activities. EW’s role in this process is the techniques and technology used to impose such restrictions on any given enemy and to provide aid to allied forces. Another example of this is drone warfare, which has become much more prevalent over the past few years. Drones help to provide an aerial advantage without the need for trained pilots and aim to provide actionable intelligence to soldiers on the ground. However, this can be a double-edged sword, for instance in the Russo-Ukrainian War, both sides have access to this technology. Therefore, both sides are rapidly attempting to out-develop the other in countering unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology and methods (Królikowski, 2022). Electronic warfare has three distinct subcategories:
- Electronic attack (EA), also known as electronic countermeasure (ECM)
- Electronic protection (EP), also known as an electronic protective measure (EPM) or electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM)
- Electronic support (ES), also known as electronic support measures (ESM) (Gortney, 2012)
Electronic attacks and countermeasures:
Electronic attack (EA) is the ‘offensive’ use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) in order to counter any enemy measures in place. A common form of this is ‘jamming’, a process used to disrupt systems (e.g. communications systems) or neutralise threats such as missiles or bombs utilising EMS technology for the purpose of navigation or detonation (Mietzner et al., 2012). Furthermore, jamming is often utilised in counterinsurgency-based conflicts such as the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 where insurgent fighters used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in order to combat NATO forces. Many of these devices are detonated via the use of radio signals and phone calls, both of which can be jammed via scrambling relevant radio frequencies, meaning no signals can be transmitted through said frequencies, therefore no explosive device can be detonated in range of these jammers. Many of these jammers are vehicle-mounted and require specialist operation due to the complexity of such devices (Kjellén, 2018). However, in more recent years, responsive communications jamming technology has been developed that allows a device to predict and jam frequencies that present a threat to military personnel on the ground (Mietzner et al., 2012). This technology has also been adapted into infantry-carriable equipment, allowing the use of this technology with a certain distance from a vehicle. This is an example of how NATO forces have increased their capabilities as they are not hindered by the threat of IEDs and can operate unimpeded, while also diminishing the capabilities of their insurgent opponents as they have lost the use of their IEDs (Mietzner et al., 2012). Another example for EA systems in modern warfare is the US Navy’s EA-18G Growler. The ‘Growler’ is a specially modified F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter jet that incorporates EW systems to aid its fellow aircraft during military operations (Hoehn, 2019). This jet is designed to be launchable via aircraft carrier and operated by a crew of two. The modifications on the Growler variant allow for it to carry five AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods. These pods allow for the crew of the aircraft to disrupt all enemy electronic radar and render communication equipment useless, effectively blinding enemy aircraft and EW assets. The Growler often flies as a support element to NATO aircraft in order to provide an edge in combat over their adversaries (Hoehn, 2019).
Electronic protection and counter-countermeasures:
Electronic Protection (EP) is the direct counterpart to Electronic Action (EA). If EA is the ‘offensive’ measure, then EP is the ‘defensive’ measure. EP measures are often used in the event that an EA is detected, even if it is friendly caused (referred to as EW fratricide). EW fratricide is a blanket term used for any EW measure that ‘backfires’ and causes harm to an unintentional target, most often friendly assets (Huber et al., 2007). An example of EW fratricide is during the war Afghanistan in 2009 when the vehicle-mounted jammers were introduced. The jammers were used to block out common frequencies, however, some US military assets such as drones still used these frequencies, resulting in crashed drones and lost equipment. An example of an EP measure is flares used by military aircraft, as most air-to-air missiles use infrared vision and tracking systems, therefore track heat-generating objects such as vehicle engines. They can be deceived by the use of burning flares dropped by the aforementioned aircraft. However, EA measures continuously adapt to EP measures, for example, modern infrared homing missiles have been modified with new seeker-head technology that features ‘flare-rejection’ logic, thus nullifying the effectiveness of flares in the first place (Gortney, 2012). This technological race of who can out-develop the other is the reason why EW is continuously evolving. Every action is met with a reaction that is then met with yet another reaction, and thus the cycle of what can be described as an ‘arms race’ continues.
Electronic warfare support and similar disciplines
Electronic warfare support (ES) is the use of EW methods in gaining military intelligence, usually done via an operational commander that detects any electromagnetic activity being used for military processes (Gortney, 2012). The main goal of ES is to detect and identify a possible threat before it has a chance to develop. Electronic support measures (ESM) are designed to be able to to identify threats in almost any environment to maximise the potential of a friendly force, while limiting the advantages of the enemy. ES is a slightly outdated terminology, as surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) are more commonplace. However, these all serve the same goal of providing relevant and categorised threat assessments to military forces operating in a conflict area (Gortney, 2012). Another discipline that is very similar to ES is signals intelligence (SIGINT), which involves the interception of signals coming from devices such as radios, phones and radars and their analysis. ES is not as clear of a subcategory as EA and EP, however, much of the information regarding these EW methods is compiled and filtered through ES programs in order to deliver workable solutions to military personnel.
Modern applications and relevance
While EW has its roots back in WW1, much of the technology has developed to such an extent that the information is barely applicable to modern standards. Therefore, the early 2000s is the most accurate timeframe for the initial application of EW that can be traced to the current day, as the technology has advanced to a point that accurate, applicable and relevant information can be brought forward in this article. The war in Afghanistan was one of the most influential events in the world of EW as it pitted a fully modernised NATO force against the insurgencies within the country. Many major EW projects were developed and tested during this time such as signal jamming technology (Gortney, 2012). While EW has had a focus on counterinsurgency methods over the past years, the war in Ukraine has opened the gates for further testing and development against a modernised force. Many of the previously mentioned EP methods used by Ukraine were immediately countered at the start of conflict back in 2022, when Russia was able to use EA measures in order to disrupt Ukrainian air defences and radar systems (Kjellén, 2018). While this was one of the most effective uses of EA in modern history, it did result in EW fratricide (Huber et al. , 2007) as the Russian forces also disrupted some of their own technology which meant that Ukraine had an increased gap to reorganise and mount a more effective defence (Bronk et al., 2022). Rapid Russian advances also led to an extensive network of Russian-owned EW complexes being established across Ukraine in newly captured territory. This led to mass suppression of Ukrainian equipment such as radio communication, GPS and the use of recon drones such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) having a short lifespan and often being lost before any useful information could be obtained. While UAVs are a cornerstone of squad-based intelligence gathering in modern military forces, their use can also be limited by an EA measure, significantly decreasing their level of effectiveness. This can be seen in the recent stages of the Russo-Ukrainian War where Russia was capable of capturing large areas of territory due to the use of EW and ensured that its own military had the advantage at every step. Now that the war has been ongoing for nearly three years, Ukraine has been able to develop their own EP systems to help in defending against Russian missile attacks (Stepanenko et al., 2024). Using the financial aid from Western countries, Ukraine has become more capable using all three stems of EW in order to defend itself against the Russian invasion (Glanville & Pattison, 2024).
Conclusion
While EW is still an evolving technology, its power and capabilities are becoming increasingly clearer to militaries across the world. With previous conflicts against less developed militaries leading to a sense of comfort in the use of GPS, unlimited radio contact and UAVs, an EA measure being able to cut off an entire fighting force adds another threat layer that is a cause for concern. One of the primary reasons why EW is such an important topic to be aware of is because it is always moving forward and the arms race between nations that are attempting to out-develop the other is becoming a point of tension between world superpowers.
Reference list
- Bronk, J., Reynolds, N., & Watling, J. (2022). Preliminary lessons in conventional warfighting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022. Royal United Services Institute. https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf
- Glanville, L., & Pattison, J. (2024). Ukraine and the opportunity costs of military aid. International Affairs, 100(4), 1571–1590.
- Gortney, W. E. (2012). Electronic Warfare [Joint publication 3-13.1]. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3-13-1.pdf
- Haig, Z. (2014). Convergence between Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support Measures. Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre, 19(3), 327–335. https://ezproxy.hhs.nl/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=98692981&site=ehost-live&scope=site
- Hoehn, J. R. (2019). Electronic warfare: Background and issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R44572). US Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44572.pdf
- Huber, A. F., Carlberg, G., Gilliard, P. & Marquet, L. D. (2007). Deconflicting Electronic Warfare in Joint Operations. In Arnold Engineering Development Center, 45. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA480913
- Kjellén, J. (2018). Russian Electronic Warfare. The role of Electronic Warfare in the Russian Armed Forces [Nr. FOI-R–4625–SE]. Swedish Ministry of Defence.
- Królikowski, H. (2022). The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary Armed Conflicts – Selected Issues. Politeja, 19(79), 17–34. https://doi-org.ezproxy.hhs.nl/10.12797/Politeja.19.2022.79.02
- Mietzner, J., Nickel, P., Meusling, A., Loos, P., & Bauch, G. (2012). Responsive communications jamming against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. IEEE Communications Magazine, 50(10), 38–46.
- Stepanenko, K., Hird, K., Bailey, R., Evans, A., & Kagan, F. W. (2024). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13, 2024. Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jan%2013%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf
While we are transparent about all sources used in this article and double-checked all the given information, we make no claims about its completeness, accuracy or reliability. If you notice a mistake or flawed phrasing that can lead to misunderstandings, please send an email to centuria-sa@hhs.nl .


Leave a comment