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Promise to Paralysis  

Georgia’s Political Landscape and its Impact on Georgian-EU Relations

By Floris Staring
16–24 minutes
Abstract

Georgia has long tried to improve its relationship with the European Union, supported by a high public enthusiasm and a history of policy reforms. However, recent political events have disrupted this progress. This report analyses how shifts in Georgia’s political environment characterized by heightened polarization, a decline in democratic standards, and the reintroduction of the Foreign Agents Law have influenced the nation’s EU membership ambitions. The analysis uses academic research, policy documents, and personal insights from interviews conducted during a study excursion to Tbilisi, Georgia, in February 2025. The findings show that while there is significant public support for EU integration, the Georgian government has adopted authoritarian measures that are at odds with core European values. Consequently, the EU has halted accession negotiations, frozen financial assistance, and redirected its support to civil society initiatives in Georgia. This has led to a growing disconnect between the government’s actions and the public’s European aspirations. Georgia’s path toward integration now hangs in the balance, caught between institutional paralysis and the ongoing promise for a European future.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank Kinga Petho, Clara Tonecker and Dr. Abanes for making it possible to visit the beautiful country of Georgia and to write this research report. Secondly, I am grateful to all the organisations who generously took their time to meet us on this trip, share their story and to provide us with valuable insights for all of our research topics.  

To everyone who joined this trip – thank you for the unforgettable memories. 

Finally, I would like to express my deepest compassion for the people of Georgia for staying strong and standing for liberty. 

1. Introduction

Only a small number of countries have pursued integration into the European Union (EU) as passionately and turbulently as Georgia. Over the past three decades, it has seen elections, protests, celebrations and major political turning points while walking the path towards the goal of European membership. In order to realize this once-promised future, twelve reform conditions laid up by the EU had to be met by Georgia to be granted full EU candidate status. Although public support for this European integration has never been higher, the Georgian Dream government does not share the same aspirations, causing several political obstacles to halt the process of EU accession. Over time, these political obstacles have damaged the political and diplomatic relationship between Georgia and the EU, shifting EU support toward Georgian civil society.  

This report examines how Georgia’s changing political landscape has affected and ultimately stalled its own path toward EU Integration. The contextual background chapter of this report will first provide some important history and information regarding Georgian politics over the last 3 decades while simultaneously shedding light on previously achieved EU integration milestones. The second chapter discusses the key political dynamics, both internal and external to Georgia, that have had the most substantial impact on the Georgian-EU relationship. The third and final chapter of this report will assess the actual consequences these developments have had on this relationship and on Georgia’s aspirations for European integration. Furthermore, three possible scenarios that Georgia may follow in the future will be discussed.  

2. Methodology

This research report is based on a qualitative, document- and interview-based research approach that combines primary and secondary sources. Academic literature, policy briefs, think tank publications and EU documentation form the core basis of the secondary research. The primary research consists of field-based research conducted during a study visit to Georgia in February 2025.  

Several interviews have been conducted with representatives and experts from diplomatic missions, academic institutions, civil society organizations and independent media. To ensure the privacy and safety of those involved, interviewees are exclusively cited by organization and date (e.g., Personal interview, GIPA, February 2025), in order to uphold academic research ethics. These primary insights provided firsthand information on political developments, Georgia’s internal situation and the EU integration process, allowing for a connection between official documents and real-world perceptions.  

3. Contextual Background

3.1 Political History

Since Georgia regained independence from the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1991, it has struggled to pave its way through a political landscape consisting of internal conflict, warlordism, civil unrest and institutional collapse (George & Stefes, 2008, p. 342). Four years later, Eduard Shevardnadze was elected President of Georgia, under whom a new constitution was adopted. Shevardnadze’s presidency marked an attempt to stabilize post-independence Georgia, but his centralization of power laid the foundation for future authoritarian tendencies (Cornell & Nilsson, 2009, pp. 252-253). This centralization of power was often misused by informal circles around the President and laid out a corrupt foundation for future presidents to dominate the Georgian political system (Jones, 2013, pp. 5-7).  

Corruption, economic standstill, electoral and political manipulation led to state-wide frustration among the Georgian people. Mass protests in late 2003, led by Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement challenged Shevardnadze’s rule and led to his resignation (Cornell & Nilsson, 2009, p. 253). Saakashvili promised Georgia modernization, market reform, strong ties with the European Union and NATO as well as drastic measures to counter corruption (Jones, 2013, pp. 3-4). He was elected president in early 2004 and quickly started to set his promises into motion. However, early signs of democratic erosion soon appeared, including media control, centralization of executive power and the suppression of opposition (George & Stefes, 2008, p. 345; Jones, 2013, pp. 6-7).  

However, Saakashvili’s modernization efforts would be undermined by growing instability in Georgia’s separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Years of rising tensions with Russia escalated into a full-scale conflict in August of 2008 when Georgian forces attempted to regain control over the provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia responded with a large-scale military intervention, ultimately recognizing the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and placing them under Russian military control (Cooley, 2008, pp. 342-344; Uchida, 2020, pp. 141-142). The conflict cost Georgia territory, economic stability and international credibility (George & Stefes, 2008, pp. 345-346).  

Saakashvili remained in power until 2012, after which he was replaced by the Georgian Dream coalition, a conservative party led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. This marked the first peaceful power transfer in post-Soviet Georgia (Jones, 2013, p. 3). The Georgian Dream coalition was initially welcomed as a democratic breakthrough, though it soon mirrored its predecessor by centralizing power and limiting political opposition (Jones, 2013, pp. 8-10; Aprasidze, 2024, pp. 238-239). Nevertheless, public support for an EU-integrated Georgian future remained strong, with over 80% of the population in favour (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 3; Aprasidze, 2024, p. 240). 

3.2 EU Integration Milestones

In 2006 and onward, Georgia implemented legal and economic reforms in an attempt to align its legislation with EU standards (Cooley, 2008, p. 343). These efforts eventually resulted in the signing of two pivotal agreements that strengthened Georgia’s commitment to European integration by stimulating political cooperation, economic modernization and trade liberalization (See Appendix A for ENP, Association Agreement and DCFTA policy details) (Aprasidze, 2024, p. 239).

These agreements paved the way for stronger economic and political integration, but the introduction of visa-free travel to the Schengen Area in 2017 is what brought these efforts closer to Georgian citizens, reinforcing already high public support for Georgia’s European aspirations (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 3). Surveys continuously proved this by showing that over 80% of the population was in favour of EU membership. Many saw it as an opportunity for economic growth, political stability and improved international status (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 3). 

In March 2022, only a few days after Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia formally applied for EU membership. This application was mainly seen as opportunistic, with the goal of positioning Georgia alongside Ukraine and Moldova as part of a “geopolitical package” of Eastern states seeking EU protection (Aprasidze, 2024, p. 239; Giuashvili, 2025, p. 2). However, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia’s stalled reform trajectory sparked hesitation in Brussels (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 2). Four months later, the EU granted Georgia a “European Perspective” status. This status essentially entails that the EU recognizes Georgia’s right to become a member in the future but conditionally holds off on full candidate status in the meantime. 12 conditions had to be met in order for Georgia to officially obtain candidate status including the following: depolarization of political discourse and institutions, judicial independence and anti-corruption measures, protection of media freedom and civil society space, and strengthening of independent oversight mechanisms (See Appendix B for full list) (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 2; Giuashvili, 2025, p. 2). 
After a year and a half of making efforts to address the 12 reform conditions, the EU granted Georgia “Conditional Candidate” status in December 2023 (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 1). While the Conditional Candidate status and the European Perspective status may seem similar, the main difference lies in their legal and political recognition. Unlike the earlier European Perspective, which carried only political weight, Conditional Candidate status also granted legal recognition, though negotiations remained on hold pending reform progress (See Appendix C for cultural analogy). However, true accession negotiations could not be started as long as the reform conditions remained in place. As a result, EU institutions continued to closely monitor Georgia’s progress, leaving its European future hanging in the balance (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 2; Giuashvili, 2025, p.1). In the Spring of 2024, the reintroduction of the Foreign Agents Law ensued with violent crackdowns led the EU to formally suspend accession negotiations and freeze €151 million in aid and shifting its support toward Georgian civil society (Giuashvili, 2025, pp. 1-4; Green 2025, p. 3). 

4. Key Political Dynamics Affecting EU Relations (2022-2025) 

4.1 Renewed Authoritarian Shift and Democratic Setbacks

Up until the early 2020s, the promise of EU integration seemed both realistic and within reach. The first key development in Georgian politics that changed this was the reintroduction of the Foreign Agents Law in 2024, despite public protests a year prior (Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025; Green, 2025, p. 2). The government framed this law as a sovereignty defence mechanism but the public widely criticized it as a Russian-style repression tactic (Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025; Green, 2025, p. 2).  
Not only did it create public uproar, but it also ignited larger protests across the country, with thousands gathering on Rustaveli Avenue – the political heart of Tbilisi – demanding the withdrawal of the law (Green, 2025, p.3). But it also raised concerns among international partners, many of whom saw it as a direct threat to freedom of speech, freedom of press and civil society independence (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 2).  The fact that the mass protests were met with the use of tear gas, water cannons and violence further undermined Georgia’s credibility and chances of EU accession (Caucasus Analytical Digest, 2024, p. 5). 
By escalating tensions with violent crackdowns and openly going against reform conditions, the Georgian government instigated what many saw as the first major breach of trust with the European Union, essentially paralysing Georgia’s accession ambitions (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 2; Caucasus Analytical Digest, 2024, p. 5). 

4.2 Political Polarisation 

Ever since Georgia regained independence from the Soviet Union, a pattern of polarization can be found that tends to repeat itself when a new ruler or ruling party is elected. Each election is quickly followed by a centralization of power and a suppression of opposition, civil society, and independent media. As Kakhashvili et al. (2021) state, Georgian politics has evolved into a ‘winner-takes-all system’, where electoral victories tend to be seen as a means to silence opposition, and not as a way to govern the country. 
This pattern has become increasingly visible in recent years, with the most recent example being the Georgian Dream party labelling political opponents, independent media, and civil society organisations as foreign agents (Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025). By doing so, the ruling party is presenting itself as the protector of Georgian sovereignty, while framing Western influence as a threat to Georgian culture and politics (Green, 2025, p. 2). Addressing this problem of polarization was officially one of the reform conditions for Georgia’s EU candidate status, one that has now put Georgia at risk of straying off this path (Lakobishvili, 2024, p. 14).  

4.3 Foreign Influence Tug-of-War: EU vs. Russia 

This political polarization fueled by internal power struggles has left Georgia vulnerable to external influences from both Russia and the European Union, predominantly because of its strategic positioning between the Caucasus Mountain region and the Black Sea. Its geographical location can be considered a point of high EU interest considering its potential to serve as a land bridge between Europe and the Caspian region (Kakachia & Lebanidze, 2022, p. 3). Furthermore, it would grant the EU access to the Southern Gas Corridor, allowing energy transport from Central Asia to Europe (Kakachia & Lebanidze, 2022, p. 4). 
Likewise, Georgia’s strategic position also makes it a key interest for Russia, which aims to use the land as part of its buffer zone to counter Western influence. Gaining control over Georgia would allow Russia to solidify its geopolitical dominance over the South Caucasus and Black Sea region (Kakachia & Lebanidze, 2022, p. 5). From Russia’s point of view, a stronger Georgian-EU relationship would pose a bigger threat to the establishment of this buffer zone. This tension is further increased by Russian-aligned narratives that frame the Western integration as a means to undermine both Russian and Georgian culture, values and sovereignty (Green, 2025, p. 2).  
As Georgia sits on the edge of major power struggles between the EU and Russia, it is often described as a “frontline state” (See Appendix D) (Caucasus Analytical Digest, 2024, p. 3). In return, the Georgian Dream party has been using this competition of interests to justify its implementation of restrictive policies by deeming them necessary to preserve sovereignty (Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025).  

4.4 Public Opinion and the EU Dream 

Despite the Georgian Dream’s attempts at undermining European integration and the narrative it has created to justify this, surveys show that public support for EU membership has remained consistently above 80% and that Georgians view it as a road to economic, political and international opportunity (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 3). While the pro-EU sentiments remain strong, the Georgians’ trust in political parties has crumbled from 21% in 2012 to 7% in 2019 and the trust in parliament from 35% in 2012 to 15% in 2019 (Opportunities Matter, 2020, p. 3). The clash of public will and government action has created a growing division, causing civil society organisations to mobilize large-scale protests and speak out against the Georgian Dream’s narrative (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 2; Personal Interview, GIPA, February 2025).

 

5. Implications for Georgian-EU Relations 

5.1 Current Diplomatic Positioning 

The diplomatic relationship between Georgia and the European Union has drastically changed due to these recent political developments, evolving from cautious optimism to strategic hesitation. In June of 2024, as a result of democratic backsliding and repression of civil society and media, the European Union formally froze the ongoing accession negotiations with Georgia (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 1). This decision made by the European Union was further influenced by the Georgian government’s unwillingness to meet the reform conditions previously laid out by the EU (Personal interview, Dutch Embassy, February 2025).  
While it is true that the European Union has frozen €151 million in financial aid as a response to these developments, it has focused its support on Georgian civil society and independent media in order to promote democratic engagement outside of government channels (Caucasus Analytica Digest, 2024, p. 5). This deliberate shift is the EU’s way of expressing its continuous support of the Georgian people as well as an indirect message of disapproval toward the Georgian government (Personal interview, Dutch Embassy, February 2025). 
This diplomatic cooling has been further manifested in the EU’s choice to minimize high-level political interactions with the Georgian leadership, indicating a diminishing trust and a downgrade in Georgia’s priority status (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 3). In response, officials from Georgian Dream have characterized the EU’s measures as foreign interference, strengthening their domestic narrative that portrays the ruling party as the ultimate protector against external dangers to Georgian independence (Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025). At the same time, the EU has increasingly aligned with civil society organizations as its main collaborators in Georgia, acknowledging them as the most dependable entities still committed to the country’s European ambitions (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 4). 

5.2 Challenges to Integration 

As the Georgian government continuously fails to implement core democratic reforms, the country’s path to EU integration will remain blocked by structural, political and geopolitical obstacles. If the key problems mentioned by the European Union such as judicial independence, media freedom and political pluralism are not addressed, Georgia’s conditional candidate status will remain as nothing more than a collection of hopes and dreams (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 2).  
By reintroducing the Foreign Agents Law in 2024, the Georgian Dream party demonstrated its own unwillingness to comply with these conditions and to listen to and work for its people (Green, 2025, p. 2; Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025). This act is part of a larger trend in which the Georgian Dream party has intentionally fueled political polarization to undermine opposition and evade inclusive reform. By persistently depicting opposition leaders and civil society members as illegitimate or foreign agents, the government has established a political environment where authentic dialogue and consensus-building have become unattainable (Kakhishvili et al., 2021, p. 6). This “winner-takes-all” environment, a recurring characteristic of Georgia’s post-Soviet political landscape, signifies a preference for short-term dominance over sustainable democratic progress and has significantly restricted Georgia’s ability to achieve the reform standards set by the European Union (Kakhishvili et al., 2021, p. 7). 
As far as the EU is concerned, the Georgian government can no longer be seen as a reliable partner and its diplomatic attitude has changed accordingly (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 3). On the contrary, internal disagreements within the EU, especially resistance from Hungary and Slovakia, have impeded the Union’s ability to respond to the Georgian Dream’s actions more forcefully (Giuashvili, 2025, p. 3). Ultimately, Georgia’s position between Russian influence and Western alignment has made its geopolitical stance increasingly unclear as it continues to drive selective reform efforts. While portraying itself as pro-European to maintain public support, the Georgian Dream government also uses sovereignty narratives to justify internal illiberalism (Green, 2025, p. 2; Kakachia & Lebanidze, 2022, p. 5; Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025).  

6. Future Scenarios 

Although the current state of the Georgian-EU relationship remains tense and uncertain, the path of this relationship will eventually depend on the development of both domestic politics as well as broader geopolitical dynamics. While Georgia finds itself caught between the public’s aspirations for European integration and a government more and more at odds with the EU’s expectations, several possible future scenarios present themselves. The following scenarios explain the most likely paths the Georgian-EU relationship may take in the upcoming years.  

6.1 Scenario 1: Reform Revival and Reengagement 
Unceasing internal and/or external pressure may convince the Georgian government to pull back the Foreign Agents Law, allowing dialogue with civil society to be reopened and several of the EU’s reform conditions to be met. Although it would still be a difficult and complicated road to full membership, it would resume negotiations with the EU, restore the currently frozen funding and return Georgia’s candidate status (Giuashvili, 2025, p 3.). This most ideal scenario would heavily depend on civil society pressure, a new election or a change in regional power dynamics (Personal interview, Rondeli Foundation, February 2025). 


6.2 Scenario 2: Prolonged Stalemate 
The Georgian Dream government continues to express its interest in future EU integration to keep public interest but does not take meaningful action. In this situation, the European Union will maintain its symbolic support towards Georgian society while keeping the diplomatic relationship frozen (Caucasus Analytical Digest, 2024, p. 5). By continuing this narrative, Georgia will continue to find itself in a grey area: too aligned with the West to be considered under Russian control, but also too illiberal to continue the path of European integration (Green, 2025, p. 4). 
 
6.3 Scenario 3: Complete De-Europeanisation 
The Georgian Dream government will continue to use and intensify the anti-EU narrative to justify its illiberal decisions, further severing any ties it still has with the European Union and aligning more closely with Russia, other authoritarian powers, or becoming an authoritarian power of its own. This scenario will end up risking long-term international isolation, a full collapse in foreign investment and aid, and further erosion of civil liberties (Giuashvili, 2025; Green, 2025, p. 5). There will be a growing disconnect between people and government as the Georgian Dream will continue to disregard the public’s needs and pro-EU opinions, possibly resulting in increased domestic unrest (STG Policy Brief, 2023, p. 3). 

7. Conclusion

Georgia’s once-promising path to EU integration has been hindered not by a lack of public support but by domestic political changes that contradict the democratic values necessary for accession. The reintroduction of the foreign agents law and the centralization of power resulted in the repression of civil society organizations, independent media and political opposition, all of which go against the EU’s democratic values. In retaliation to these developments, the EU has not only frozen millions in funding but also Georgia’s EU candidate status. Despite the Georgian Dream’s disregard for the public’s needs and aspirations, the Georgian people remain committed to the European future. The European Union has acknowledged this by shifting its support to civil society, strengthening its relationship with the Georgian population rather than its political leadership. This analysis has traced Georgia’s steps on a journey from promise to paralysis. In the face of growing repression, it is the determination of its people, not its government, that still keeps the European dreams of Georgia alive. 

Reference List
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While we are transparent about all sources used in this article and double-checked all the given information, we make no claims about its completeness, accuracy or reliability. If you notice a mistake or misleading phrasing, please contact centuria.sa@hhs.nl .

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