By Hans Propsma
17th of December 2025
15 minutes
Introduction
The Russia-Ukraine war has been ongoing for (upon the date of publication) almost 4 years, bringing death and destruction to the European continent that has not been seen since the second world war. As is true with most wars throughout history, the Russia-Ukraine war has invented its own way of killing; the drone. Estimates vary depending on the source, but drones are believed to account for about 70 – 80% of all combat casualties in Ukraine (Nieczypor, 2025). With new technologies, there also come new tactics to apply those technologies to the field of war. Russian bombers that were once thought to be safely out of reach of Ukrainian drone and/or missile attacks, have been struck by a new kind of warfare.
On the First of June 2025, the Security Service of Ukrainian (SBU) conducted a surprise attack against the Russian strategic bomber fleet. The operation, called ‘Operation Spiderweb’, successfully destroyed or damaged several Russian aircraft. The strikes on four Russian airbases were carried out by short distance First Person View (FPV) drones, launched from Russia’s own territory and were smuggled into the country by the SBU (Dahlgren, 2025).
This article intends to analyze this new form of drone warfare, starting with a broad overview of the strategic playing field, followed by a deep analysis of Operation Spiderweb from a tactical and operational perspective. This will be supported by identifying the strategic consequences that not only Russia will have to confront, but the western world as well.
Strategic Context
During the early days of the Ukrainian war, there was an expectation that Ukraine would not be able to hold out against the Russian colossus for a significant amount of time. However, despite popular belief, the Ukrainian military has been able to hold the Russians (relatively) at bay. From a purely statistical perspective this is a notable achievement, as the Russian military has significantly more resources to draw on than their Ukrainian counterparts. Through western military aid, and the use of novel tactics, the Ukrainians were able to defy the odds.
As for the novel tactics, the denial of the use of the Russian Black Sea Fleet through the use of missiles and air/maritime drones is a prime example. These inventive ways of conducting war have been able to counter the asymmetrical balance of power between these two warring nations. This asymmetry comes down to finances, a Ukrainian MAGURA V5 maritime drone cost approximately $250.000-300.000 (Wertheim, 2025), but the ships these drones target cost significantly more. Take for example the Sergey Kotov, a Russian patrol ship sunk in March 2024. This ship was commissioned on the 30th of July 2022, at an estimated building cost of $65 million. In the attack on the Sergey Kotov the Ukrainians used 5 MAGURA V5 drones, that is a difference in cost of almost $64 million (Reuters, 2024). There are many tactics that Ukraine uses to counter the asymmetry in resources, another example would be the targeting of the Russian strategic bomber fleet through the use of FPV drones. The FPV drones used cost not more than $2000, while the Tu 22M3 bombers these drones target cost at least $100 million (Litnarovych, 2025).
The Russian Airforce is one of only three air forces in the world that currently operates strategic bombers, the others are the United States and China. The Russian bomber fleet is thought to operate 126 strategic bombers (in 2025), spread over three types:
- 55 Tu-22M3 Backfires
- 58 Tu-95 Bears
- 13 Tu-160 Blackjacks
Russia does not have the ability to replace these Soviet era bombers since the production lines do not exist anymore. These bombers are based far from the frontlines in Ukraine to prevent missile and/or drone attacks from destroying or damaging them. The Russian strategic bomber fleet regularly conducts operations against targets in Ukraine, launching missiles from a safe distance to destroy targets in Ukraine (Dahlgren, 2025).
Operation Spiderweb
The Ukrainians, who were/are not in possession of missiles with enough range to target the airbases where strategic bombers are stationed, resulting in the need for a new tactic. The Security Service of Ukraine otherwise known as the SBU, successfully conducted strikes on four airbases on the 1st of June 2025. The operation, entitled “Operation Spiderweb”, took the SBU 18 months of planning and preparation before execution.
In theory, the plan was simple: smuggle FPV drones into Russia near to where the airbases are located and then strike at the bomber fleet. In practice, however, the operation was much more complex, first the SBU needed to establish the logistical network to facilitate the attack. Smuggling operators and equipment into Russia via neighboring countries to a safe location, one which was a warehouse located in Chelyabinsk, close to the border of Kazakhstan. Upon arrival, they had to prepare the delivery method, for this they used modified shipping containers that would serve as a launching platform for the FPV drones. This was followed by another challenge: moving the containers close to the Russian airbases. To accomplish this, the SBU hired unknowing Russian truck drivers to drive the containers close to the airbases, managing to avoid suspicion through the use of shell companies. Once the truck drivers drove the launching containers close enough to the airbases, then the top of the container came off, and the drones were released. The FPV drones were directly controlled by Ukrainian drone pilots through the use of the Russian 4G network. At the time of the attack the SBU operators had already left Russian territory (Dahlgren, 2025).
Operation Spiderweb successfully targeted the Olenya airbase in Murmansk Oblast, Ivanovo airbase in Ivanovo Oblast, Dyagilivo airbase in Ryazan Oblast and the Belaya airbase in Irkutsk Oblast. Seven Tu-95 Bears, 4 Tu-22M3 Backfires and 1 An-12 Cub are confirmed destroyed. Furthermore, 2 Backfires have also been confirmed damaged, and four Backfires, two A-50 Mainstays (Airborne Warning And Control System, AWACS) and one Il-78 Midas Tanker have been confirmed to be targeted according to satellite images and footage published by the SBU. President Zelensky has claimed that the total destroyed or damaged aircraft number 41, of which half would have been destroyed (IISS, 2025).
Implications for Russia
The implications of operation Spiderweb are significant for Russia, not only on a military level but on a psychological one as well. Russian Military bloggers have called operation Spiderweb the “Pearl Harbor of Russia”, even though this comparison is quite flawed since Pearl Harbor was a preemptive strike while operation Spiderweb was conducted in a later stage in of the war, it does still speak to the impact the Ukrainian attack has had on the Russian populations state of mind. As for more military focused consequences of the attack, the Russian air force can no longer assume that by basing their bombers far from the front that they are out of the combat zone. This will necessitate the Russians to come up with new tactics to counter similar attacks in the future. Furthermore the implications for the nuclear triad of the Russians are also clear, the nuclear triad consists of being able to deliver nuclear strikes from the ground, sea and air to ensure that there always can be a retaliation in case of all out nuclear war. The strategic bomber fleet is a part of this triad, and since the Russians can not build new bombers, the loss of even one of their nuclear capable bombers is significant. Especially if you consider that normally only a third of the fleet is actively deployed, the other two thirds are either grounded or undergoing maintenance. Thus the destruction of these bombers will strain the strategic bomber fleet and force other bombers to be deployed longer than before, leading to more wear and tear on the aircrafts.
Implications for the West
Operation Spiderweb has not only drawn attention in Russia, but in the western world too. Similar sorts of attacks could be carried out by hostile actors against the west, and at the moment there are only limited countermeasures in place. An attack on the scale of Operation Spiderweb would be unlikely to occur against the west, but with the increasing prevalence of drones there still exists a chance. In recent months there have been numerous incidents of drones that have flown above NATO airbases and airports, stopping planes from taking off and landing at those airbases and airports. NATO members have had a hard time countering these small scale drone incursions, this raises concerns that in the case of a large scale drone attack NATO would be underprepared.
Armed forces in Ukraine often use jamming to counter drone threats, but this would be a very costly option to use within NATO territory. This is because jamming targets all communication channels, and if NATO would utilize this countermeasure it would significantly disrupt all communications. This could cause panic but also economic damages, since the modern economy relies on communication technologies to function. So NATO will have to come up with new ways to address the drone threat, creating new air defense systems and deploying those systems not only on the borders of NATO, but in the interior too.
The problem with the current air defense systems used by NATO is their cost. During the night of the 9th-10th of September there were Russian drone incursions in NATO airspace in Poland, to counter this threat NATO F-35 and F-16 fighter jets were scrambled. The NATO jets quickly downed several drones, and thus effectively counter the threat. The problem is that just the flight cost of an F-35 is $40,000 per hour, and the AIM-120 missiles that shot down the drones cost $1 million per missile. The F-16 has a lower flight cost at about $20,000 per hour, but NATO also scrambled Italian AWACS which also increased the cost of the response. Now consider that the Russian drones are estimated to cost $10,000, there were 21 of them so a total cost of $210,000. This still does not come close to the cost of a single AIM-120 missile.
Conclusion
Operation Spiderweb is an example of the broader transformation of warfare; relatively inexpensive and widely available technologies can have a disproportionate effect on the war effort. By successfully targeting Russia’s strategic bomber fleet far from the frontlines, the Ukrainians have demonstrated that geographic depth no longer guarantees protection against attacks by adversaries. This challenges the current doctrinal ideas of rear area security and the survivability of high value military assets.
For Russia, operation spiderweb highlights the increasing vulnerability of their strategic bomber fleet, that cannot be easily replaced and that is still central to both conventional strikes and nuclear deterrence. This is a trend that does not only apply to their bombers, but also to the other high value military assets the Russians possess. Furthermore the implications extend beyond Russia, the Western armed forces should also learn from operation spiderweb, particularly in regard to air defense and basing tactics. The current NATO air defenses are adequate for addressing the threats of Russian fighter jets and strategic bombers, but lack the capabilities to cost effectively address the threat of single use drones. This should raise questions about how to adapt to this kind of threat, and highlights the need for a more layered and cost effective air defense.
The historical precedent shows that such shifts in warfare are not unprecedented, the introduction of the tank by the British during the First World War initially also created a similar problem for the Germans where the defensive measures outpaced the offensive measurers. Eventually though warfare adapted, first with the creation of antitank rifles then the shaped charge launchers like the panzerfaust and the RPG, and later guided missile systems like the Javelin. This pattern of innovation and adaptation illustrates how new offensive capabilities tend to provoke the development of a new set of countermeasures.
With this historical precedent in mind, operation spiderweb should not be seen as a singular anomaly, but as a part of the ongoing cycle of invention and adaptation in warfare. Cheap unmanned drones exploit weaknesses in current defensive tactics, but with changes to military doctrine and the development of new technologies those weaknesses will be addressed. The challenge for states now is to not only recognize these new threats, but to adapt to them. In the past states have shown their ability to do just that, and FPV drones are just another new weapon that will inevitably be countered.
Sources:
Dahlgren, M., & MacKenzie, L. (2025, June 4). Ukraine’s drone swarms are destroying Russian nuclear bombers. What happens now? Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-drone-swarms-are-destroying-russian-nuclear-bombers-what-happens-now
(IISS) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025, June 2). Operation Spiderweb: An assessment of Russian Aerospace Forces losses. IISS Online Analysis. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/062/operation-spiderweb-an-assessment-of-russian-aerospace-forces-losses/
Litnarovych, V. (2025, April 9). Ukrainian drones destroy $100 million TU-22M3 supersonic bomber right after landing. UNITED24. https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukrainian-drones-destroy-100-million-tu-22m3-supersonic-bomber-right-after-landing-7453
Nieczypor, K. (2025, 21 november). Game of drones: the production and use of Ukrainian battlefield unmanned aerial vehicles. OSW Centre For Eastern Studies. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-10-14/game-drones-production-and-use-ukrainian-battlefield-unmanned#:~:text=At%20present%2C%20drones%20are%20responsible,including%20killed%20and%20wounded%20personnel).
Reuters. (2024, March 5). Ukrainian sea drones damage Russian Black Sea Fleet patrol ship near Crimea, Ukraine says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-sea-drones-damage-russian-black-sea-fleet-patrol-ship-near-crimea-2024-03-05/
Wertheim, E. (2025, September). Ukraine’s Magura naval drones: Black Sea equalizers. Proceedings, 151(9). U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/september/ukraines-magura-naval-drones-black-sea-equalizers
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