The Problem with European Defense Infrastructure

By Hans Propsma

13 May, 2026

8 minutes

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, defense has become a central topic of discussion in European politics. Europe is under pressure to rearm to face the threat posed by Russia and its allies. Following the NATO Summit held in the Hague during the summer of 2025, an agreement was made to spend 3.5% of each country’s GDP on defense and 1.5% of its GDP on defense infrastructure (NATO, 2025). Even if Europe successfully rearms, it will need infrastructure to rapidly deploy forces to the eastern flank in an emergency. Although Europe does have infrastructure in place to move forces to the eastern flank, it is not sufficient should an emergency occur. The European nations know of this weak point and are addressing the vulnerability by investing in infrastructure, both for military and civilian usage, as well as reducing the administrative barriers connected with moving forces across borders (European Commission, n.d.). This article will outline the current state of European infrastructure and the urgent necessity of improvements.

Definition of defense infrastructure

Defense infrastructure is a broad term, but it can be broken down into three parts:

First, physical mobility relates to roads, railways, ports, and airfields. In other words, the infrastructure that militaries and civilian organizations alike use to transport equipment, individuals, and goods from point A to point B.

Second, operational infrastructure refers to military-specific infrastructure, such as bases, storage depots, and command systems. Even if European countries can send troops and equipment to the eastern flank, there needs to be infrastructure to support those forces. If a country deploys a formation of tanks, there has to be a place to refuel, repair, and rearm those tanks relatively close to the frontline(s).

Third, system infrastructure has to do with energy systems, cyber capabilities, and industrial capabilities. In a crisis, the military will rely on civilian systems. Forces need electricity, communications equipment, and an industrial base to function properly in a crisis.

EU military mobility weaknesses

The problem with military mobility can be best addressed in two parts. The first problem is physical infrastructure bottlenecks. The EU has dense road infrastructure for transporting anything from A to B, but this is primarily focused on fulfilling civilian needs. A military convoy carrying tanks requires bridges that can handle a load that would not be necessary for civilian transport. Further, a convoy needs tunnels that are high and wide enough for convoys to pass through, which certain tunnels built for civilian use are not capable of.

Rail infrastructure is critical for military mobility, since heavy equipment can be moved more easily by using rail transport. In 2022, Poland had 19,392 km of railroads, of which 13,323 km are of strategic importance. Of these railroads, 76.5% can withstand a load of 221 kilonewtons. The transport of heavy equipment requires rails to be able to withstand such a load. Another problem with rail infrastructure is that not all military facilities have railway sidings, which are needed to (un)load without disrupting rail traffic. This problem is also amplified because of the lack of railway ramps at the sidings that do exist. Further, there are significant bottlenecks, for example, with railway line number 353 (Poznań – Inowrocław – Toruń – Iława – Olsztyn). In Toruń (Poland), there is a single-track tunnel that creates a capacity limitation (Pierzak, 2024).

Additionally, seaports are essential for military mobility, and Europe has numerous ports. European ports are excellent in terms of civilian usage, but are lacking in their military capabilities. Military use of ports requires areas that are protected from attacks, resilience against sabotage or cyberattacks, and rapid unloading capabilities.

The main theme that is present among Europe’s physical infrastructure that limits its capabilities in a crisis is the lack of military involvement in infrastructure. For Europe to achieve its military infrastructure requirements, it needs more dual-use infrastructure. The EU has identified 500 “hotspot projects” along four key transport corridors and is acting on addressing this issue, but there is a second problem with military mobility, namely, legal and regulatory issues complicating the rapid deployment of forces.

The Schengen Area allows free internal movement within its 29 member states, but it only covers civilian movements. Military units need to navigate various types of clearances, procedures, and permits to cross borders. This further complicates the rapid deployment of forces in a crisis. This is why the idea of a military equivalent of Schengen is promising. The European Commission’s 2025 military mobility package attempts to simplify the movement of forces across its borders by creating common rules and procedures for military transport. The European Commission has also created a new European Military Mobility Enhanced Response System that can, in times of crisis, enable rapid redeployment of forces (European Commission, n.d.).

Further EU infrastructure weaknesses

Military mobility is essential in a crisis, but there needs to be infrastructure in place to support the armed forces. If a crisis were to occur, the forces sent to the eastern flank could only be effective should they be properly supplied and maintained. Fuel and ammunition depots will need to already be in place to be able to handle a surge in forces and will eventually need to be resupplied. Europe will need additional industrial infrastructure to be able to handle a high-intensity conflict.

Energy resilience will also be critical in a crisis scenario, for military and civilian use alike. Bases, ports, airports, railways, factories, and many more critical infrastructure assets need electricity to operate. Energy security is therefore paramount to the security of Europe. Europe’s critical energy infrastructure has become vulnerable to sabotage. This is due to a lack of both maintenance and investment in energy infrastructure. Furthermore, Russia has already attempted to undermine the energy security of Europe by committing acts of sabotage against European targets (Edwards & Seidenstein, 2025).

One of the sabotage tactics that could be used by foreign adversaries is cyberattacks. The security and continual operation of digital infrastructure is just as vital as the continued operation of logistical convoys, since those convoys are all coordinated through various forms of digital communication. Additionally, physical elements of digital infrastructure, including subsea cables, which connect Europe to the rest of the world, must be strengthened.

Conclusion

With the Russian threat consistently increasing, Europe needs to urgently look at its current infrastructure capabilities with a critical eye. Improvements need to be made in physical infrastructure, with a focus on improving current capabilities and removing both physical and bureaucratic bottlenecks. Further, Europe needs to adopt a strategy of resilience against attacks, sabotage, and cyberattacks. For war is not only won by military might, but through robust and efficient logistics and infrastructure.

Reference list:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2025, June 25). The Hague Summit Declaration. NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration

European Commission. (n.d.). Military mobility. Defence Industry and Space. Retrieved May 6, 2026, from https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/military-mobility_en

Pierzak, A. (2024). Rail transport in the aspect of military mobility. Kwartalnik Bellona, 716(1), 59–74. https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0054.7316

Edwards, C., & Seidenstein, N. (2025, August 19). The scale of Russian sabotage operations against Europe’s critical infrastructure. International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/08/the-scale-of-russian–sabotage-operations–against-europes-critical–infrastructure/

Munster, B. (2026, February 26). EU gets ready for Russian attacks on power grids after Ukraine’s winter of blackouts. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-gets-ready-russia-attacks-power-grids-after-ukraine-winter-blackouts/

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